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3ABSTRACT
This paper deals with the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians and its spatial
expression on the ground as it is manifested in the Israeli facts on the ground in Jerusalem. The
underlying thesis of the paper is that the reality on the ground differs from the reality of the
political negotiations and that it is necessary to add more dimensions to the understanding of the
conflict than those presented by international law. In applying a post-structuralist approach and a
notion of territory informed by critical political geography and critical IR it opens up for
understanding the role of territory in the conflict, especially in Jerusalem, the motivation for
conducting facts on the ground and how these reflect the Government of Israel’s overriding
strategies for its presence in the Palestinian territories. The paper concludes that the Israeli
presence in the Palestinian territories is better understood as an ethnic project than an occupation,
but this is due to the special connection between territory, legitimacy and ethnicity in the Jewish
Zionist construction of the Israeli state.
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7INTRODUCTION // AREA OF RESEARCH
Introduction
Ever since the General Assembly of the United Nations in November 1947 adopted resolution 181(II) and
thereby decided on the partition of the British Mandate territory of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state,
the two parties involved have had competing and conflicting territorial claims over the Palestinian territories.
The claims are so conflicting that the two parties are upholding one of the longest-running and most
contentious conflicts in the world. The UN Partition Plan constituted two states for two people, but ever
since its declaration, Israel has disputed the legitimacy of the Palestinians’ claim to the territory of the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israel has manifested its reluctance to accept and respect the borders laid out in the
Partition Plan by upholding a continued Israeli military and civilian presence in the Palestinian territories
since the war of 1967, by annexing East Jerusalem – the supposed capital of the Palestinian state – and by
creating continuous facts on the ground on Palestinian soil.
The Israeli presence in the Palestinian territories, as manifested by the Israeli facts on the ground, are
creating a political organization of space, which seems to have overtaken the political negotiations from the
inside, creating new patterns of ethno-spatial relations of such magnitude that it constitutes a concrete
physical obstacle for the peace negotiations and the sustainability of any conceivable Palestinian state. It is
therefore necessary to change the focus of analysis from political negotiations to the realities on the ground,
in order to analyze and understand the humanitarian and political ramifications of the Israeli presence in the
Palestinian territories in the short as well as long term.
Characterizing the conflict
At one level the conflict can be seen to be essentially over the competing claims of two different nations to
one area of land, which proposes a conceptualization of the conflict as a territorial struggle. This definition
has shaped the framework of the United Nations and international law, which has contested the Israeli
presence in the Palestinian territories through numerous UN resolutions, rejecting the Israeli claim to the
territory as occupation violating the sovereignty of the Palestinians. Israel is considered an occupying power
in the Palestinian territories qua the invasion of the territories and the implementation of the authority of the
Israeli army, whereby Israel exercises de facto but not de jure authority. This perspective was also expressed
in the advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice in July 20041, whereby the term ‘Occupying
power’ as a description of the Israeli presence in the Palestinian territories took on a precise legal meaning.
1 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf - 4. maj 2013
8In Israel, the Israeli High Court of Justice concurs with this language, and has ruled that Israel holds the West
Bank under ‘belligerent occupation’2. The Israeli government (GOI) is rejecting this interpretation of the
conflict, referring to the Palestinian territories as disputed territories’3 arguing that the Palestinian people has
never constituted a sovereign national unity.
Occupation of one state by another state is in itself not illegal, as long as it is not permanent and as long as
certain responsibilities are met, as codified in the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Convention, to which
Israel is signatory. But Israel is not meeting these obligations on a number of counts. Among these
responsibilities are the statutory obligations of article 49, §6 of the Geneva Convention, prohibiting the
Occupying Power the deportation or transfer of persons into occupied territory in order to avoid such actions
motivated by political or racial reasons or as part of a colonization project, where the Occupying Power
could have interest in changing the permanent status of the occupied territory. Israel is in the Palestinian
Territories acting directly against this clause upholding an extensive strategy of creating facts on the ground
on Palestinian territory.
Facts on the ground
During the last decades there has been a drastic increase in these Israeli structures established within the
Palestinian territories; territory supposedly constituting the sovereign territorial state of the Palestinian
people. These facts on the ground are composed of the transfer of Israeli military and civilians and the
establishment of physical structures to house them (settlements and military bases), an extensive support
system for these Israeli enclaves comprised by security facilities, farm lands and separate road systems and
the so called separation barrier from 2002. Today there are approximately 400.000 to 500.0004 Israeli settlers
living in the West Bank of which approximately 190.000-200.000 are living in East Jerusalem5; the part of
the divided city, which was meant to be the capital of an independent Palestinian state. According to the
Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, Israel has established 124
settlements in the West Bank from 1967 to mid-2011 and additionally 100-200 outposts have been erected.
2http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/f45643a78fcba719852560f6005987ad/380fd102b1711ea48525705a00524cf6/$FIL
E/HCJ%20ruling.pdf – 4. maj
3 http://new.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2003/Pages/DISPUTED%20TERRITORIES-
%20Forgotten%20Facts%20About%20the%20We.aspx – 4. maj 2013
4 The total population in Israel was according to the World Bank 7,7 million in 2011 – this number includes the settlers
living in the Palestinian territories and the Palestinians living within Israel proper. According to the Israel’s Central
Bureau of Statistics the number has just reach 8 million (April, 2013) – of which 75,3% of the population, about 6
million people, is Jewish and 20,7% of the population is Arab/Palestinian, which is the equivalent of about 1,6 million.
5 According to the Israeli Bureau of Statistics, the United Nations and the Council for European and Palestinian
Relations
9The settlement enterprise does not only lead to the transfer of a large number of Israelis to Palestinian
territory, but is also prompting Israeli confiscation of large amounts of Palestinian land – all working
alongside and in symbiosis with the Israeli control system, which is similarly confiscating land for upholding
its ‘matrix of control’ (Halper, 2009). The Israeli control system is working in and around the Palestinian
territories to secure Israeli access, presence and control, which is physically and spatially manifested in
check points, road blocks and military presence. The Israeli control system is furthermore manifested in the
so called separation barrier, which has the dual function of putting additional restrictions on movement for
the Palestinians and controlling their access to Israel proper, as well as de facto annexing Palestinian land;
8,5% of the West bank is on the Israeli side of the barrier, and 3,4 % is on the other side, but partly or
completely surrounded6. The length of the separation barrier will in total be 709km, a distance twice as long
as the Green line and 85% of its planned route runs through the West Bank.
In Jerusalem, the supposed capital of the two sovereign states, as laid down in the Partition Plan, the Israeli
annexation following the war of 1967 has further increased the magnitude of the Israeli facts on the ground
as well as the pace by which they are established. It is also in the outskirt of the city that the most recent
developments within the settlement enterprise is taking place, after the GOI in 2012 decided to move forward
with their plans of building in the controversial E1 zone just outside Jerusalem, loudly rejected and opposed
by the international community. Today a large number of Israeli building plans are being promoted in East
Jerusalem, some that will expand already existing neighborhoods and some that entail building new
neighborhoods. When completed, these new structures will encircling East Jerusalem with Israeli
neighborhoods and will support what seems to be the twofold goals of the Municipality of Jerusalem;
expanding the city’s Jewish population and reducing its Palestinian population. These goals, clearly against
the instructions laid down in international convention and peace proposals, raises the question of how the
Municipality is in fact conducting such actions and which strategies and motives are behind these political
attempts of controlling the social, demographic and political organization of space.
Even though East Jerusalem was annexed in 1967 and thereby differs from the rest of the Palestinian
territories, it seems to be a forecast for what could happen to the rest of the Palestinian territories and has so
far been a central point in the suggested conflict resolutions. What is going on in Jerusalem is furthermore
important due to the city’s symbolic and political meaning for the Israelis as well as the Palestinians; the
religious meaning of the holy places, the political meaning of the capital as well as its symbolic meaning
within the national narratives for both people. These factors make the city a central battle ground for the
ongoing dispute between the Israelis and the Palestinians over territory and legitimacy.
6 http://www.btselem.org/separation_barrier/map - 4.maj 2013
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New patterns of ethno-spatial relations
Through the above-mentioned facts on the ground Israel has inside, what is according to UN resolution 181
(II) supposed to be a sovereign Palestinian state, created a matrix of Israeli presence and sections of territory
which is now possessed and controlled by the Israelis. The magnitude of these Israeli structures established
on Palestinian territory has today reached such proportions that several scholars and practitioners working
within the field are rejecting the idea of a two-state-solution. Within international law there are voices
criticizing and rejecting the conceptualizing of the Israeli presence in the Palestinian territories as an
occupation e.g. Cavanaugh (2002) and Benvenisti (2004), arguing that it is not meeting the criterion of
temporality. This criticism of the current and dominating narrative raises the question of how then to
characterize the conflict? Furthermore it questions the underlying motives for the GOI for upholding and
implementing its territorial ambitions in the Palestinian territories bypassing international law and
international conventions.
Focusing on the actual development of the facts on the ground and the social, political and demographic
development of the Israeli presence in the Palestinian territories, scholars within the field of critical
geography and critical IR have questioned the narrative of occupation instead applying an analytical
framework of colonialism (e.g. Kimmerling, 2008) or ethnicity (Smooha, 2002, Yiftachel, 2005). This
perspective challenge the framework of international law as well as the dominating conception of territory
within the field of IR; that of territoriality as a spatial expression of the idea of an exclusive sovereignty (cf.
the Treaty of Westphalia) bound to the notion of sovereignty as a particular form of power (Krasner, 1999).
Instead the field of critical geography and critical IR apply a different conceptualization of territory; seeing
territory as a material as well as a symbolic phenomenon embedded in a historical, cultural and political
context. This perspective stresses and denaturalizes the relationship between territory and power, meaning
and experience and allows us to see the Israeli attempts of political organization of space in the Palestinian
territories as a number of de- and reterritorialization processes, which spatially manifests the changes of the
relationship between social life and its territorial anchorings.
Applying this framework, my aim is to contribute to an understanding of the multifaceted conflict between
the Israelis and the Palestinians, by focusing on the complex reality on the ground through which I will try to
understand the nature of the Israeli presence in the Palestinian territories and its political ramifications. I will
conduct my analysis using the city of Jerusalem as a case, surveying the facts on the ground and analyzing
them as intentional attempts of changing the ethno-spatial organization of the city. Through the empirical
case study and the application of relevant theory and documentation, I will analyze the GOI’s motives,
strategies of legitimization and narratives of territoriality.
I will conduct my analysis using the following research question:
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Which ethno-spatial strategies are manifested in the urban development of Jerusalem and how does
these strategies relate to the GOI’s overriding strategy of legitimizing its presence in the Palestinian
territories.
The research question will be answered by
(a) An empirical assessment and analysis of the facts on the ground in Jerusalem and its manifestation
of a certain ethno-spatial organization
(b) A theoretical investigation of the notion of territory in the conflict between the Israelis and the
Palestinians, including the role of the city of Jerusalem
(c) An analytical assessment of the Israeli strategies of re-territorializations
(d) A theoretical investigation of the Israeli strategies of legitimization
(e) An analytical assessment of the correspondence between the Israeli strategies of re-territorializations
and its strategies of legitimizing its presence in the Palestinian territories
The methodological, theoretical and scientific considerations regarding the conduct of my analysis and the
preparation of this paper will be presented in the following chapter on methodology.
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2. METHODOLOGICAL & THEORETICAL APPROACH
In this chapter I will present the methodological and theoretical approach applied in this paper including
considerations regarding the delimitation, choice of theorists and theory of science.
2.1 Focus and delimitation
In this paper I have chosen to focus mainly on the Israeli side of the conflict, emphasizing the Israeli
territorial strategies in the Palestinian territories and their ramifications. In a conflict involving two parties
one could argue that both sides should be equally represented. Furthermore when it comes to the case of
Israel and Palestine, the argument could be stressed to involve other agents as well, given the special and
extensive influence of the Jewish diaspora, the Palestinian refugees and the involvement of the United States.
Additionally it could be indicated that I, by de-emphasizing the Palestinian side and their responses to the
Israeli actions, are substantiating the narrative of the weak and dependent peoples vis-à-vis the strong Israeli
state. With these objections in mind, I have chosen to narrow down my analysis focusing on Israel and the
Israeli actions within the Palestinian territories, since my focus is on the actions on the ground and their
humanitarian and political consequences. These actions, as manifested in the Israeli facts on the ground, are
constructed by the GOI and is supported by a bifurcated network of administrative, social and political
policies and practices at all levels of the Israeli society. In order to explore this network and due to space
limitations my focus is on the Israeli side. My aim is not the present the Palestine side as week or indifferent,
this focus is simply diverting from the subject I want to explore.
It has been necessary to exclude a number of subjects from this paper; among others the Palestinian reactions
and counter-reactions to the Israeli presence in the territories, the ethnic logic of capital and the
connectedness of the economy of Israel and the PA , the political system and its embedded logic of
ethnoclasses, the processes of peace agreements and conflicts throughout the history of the Israel-Palestine
conflict as well as a more traditional power-analysis, which could have focused on Israel, its relation to the
United States and its role as a ‘Western ally’ in the Middle East. Due to space limitations is was furthermore
necessary for me to exclude a number of intermediate results such as the evaluation of the power balance at
present day, the historic development of the settler movement, the extension and conduct of the Israeli
control system and the status of the Palestinian Authority and its actual potential for administering a future
Palestinian state.
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2.2 Choice, use and critique of materials and sources
I have mainly used theorist working within the field of critical geography and critical IR, focusing on the
subject of Israel and Palestine. In the empirical assessment of Jerusalem, I have mainly used data from
acknowledged and well-reputed organizations and NGO such as the Israeli Information Center for Human
Rights in the Occupied Territories, the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, Ir Amim and others. I
have furthermore gained data and knowledge from the United Nations agencies working in the area,
especially OCHA and UNWRA. The sources of knowledge I have chosen to use are all among the critics of
the Israeli rule of the Palestinian territories, if I would have had more time and space, it would have been
interesting and enlightening to include more dissident sources. Since my aim has been to apply theory on the
facts I have deduced on Jerusalem in order to conceptualize the Israeli presence in the Palestinian territories
within this specific framework, I think my results within this context is valid, as long as it is not trying to
present an overall reality, but instead a specific clipping of a broader context. The theorists applied are
similarly within the same branch of critical geography and critical IR, representing the new history tendency
within Israeli scholars and a critical approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict. They do not differ much in their
theory of science approach, but a more nuanced picture could perhaps have been presented if I have chosen
more divergent theorists and if I had included Palestinian theorists as well.
My aim with this paper have been to try to apply a different approach than the one usually applied, by
conceptualization the Israeli presence in the Palestinian territories not just as an occupation or a territorial
conquest, but questioning the underlying assumptions of such conceptualizations through a more post-
structualist notion of territory emphazising the social, contextual and political dimensions of territory. Due to
space limitations my theoretical framework is rather limited and does not allow for a thoroughly assessment.
My primary theorist has been the Israeli professor in political geography Oren Yiftachel and his notion of
ethnocracy. As a source to exploring the conflict between Israel and Palestine from a political geographic
angle Yiftachel offers a comprehensive and profound assessment of the dynamics of territorial and ethnic
conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but he sometimes compromise his own agenda by
sustaining a very static picture of the conflict and the dynamics between the two people. Especially the
dynamics within both societies are lacking as well as the causal explanations for why Israel has developed
into an ethnocracy.
The other theorists applied in this paper are mainly Israeli scholars such as Neve Gordon, focusing on the
military occupation of the Palestinian territories, Menachem Klein conceptualizing the latest developments
of the nature of the Israeli-Palestine conflict as well as its expression and manifestations in Jerusalem and the
Israeli architect and intellectual Eyal Weizman who contributes to this paper with his focus on the spatial
expression of the conflict and the Israeli control over the Palestinian territories and people. I have
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furthermore inclined with the subject through the writings of political geographer David Delaney, David
Newman and sociologist Baruch Kimmerling among others.
2.3 Theory of science and theoretical approach
In this paper I have wanted to apply a post-structuralist approach to the field of IR and Global Studies, which
is why my concept of territory and my perception of the conflict is informed by critical IR theory and critical
political geographers. Instead of applying the usual framework of IR with a focus on power relations, wars
and military my aim has been to present a more nuanced pictured by presenting some of the many
dimensions at play in an international conflict such as the one between Israel and Palestine. My starting point
is within post-structuralism, which has also formed my approach and the conceptualizations applied. The
main consequence of this approach is that the notion of territory is seen as embedded in a historical, cultural
and political context stressing and denaturalizing the relationship between territory and power, meaning and
experience. Furthermore this approach implicate a notion of the international system of states, where it is not
only a question of power and power relations, but recognizing the influence of culture, history, narratives and
the construction of sense with is similarly to the approach presented within the idealist branch of IR theory.
Hence the theory of science applied in this paper is a mixture of an idealist IR approach and a post-
structuralist approach, through which I recognize how our world is constructed through language and sense-
making at the same time recognizing some form of material reality.
2.4 Validity
The validity of this paper is consolidated through the accurate use of the theorist and their writings, through a
consistent use of terms and sources and furthermore through a transparent work process and laying down of
reflections, intermediate results and conclusions. The paper deals with a highly loaded and politically
subject, but I have throughout the paper presented the issues on the basis of reliable sources and on the basis
on the facts on the ground, applying the theoretical framework in order to conclude on connections and
understandings.
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3. EMPIRICAL PRESENTATION // JERUSALEM
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will present the case study of the city of Jerusalem, through which I will analyze the ethno-
spatial strategies applied by the GOI and its relation to its overriding strategy of legitimizing its presence in
the Palestinian territories. In the assessment of the case of Jerusalem, the focus is on the strategies applied in
relation to the development of the city since the Israeli annexation in 1967 and on the current situation on the
ground today. Focusing on the actual facts on the ground the presentation will treat subjects such as the
Israeli settlement enterprise within Jerusalem, the spatial distribution among the Israeli and the Palestinian
inhabitants and the administrative measure backing the spatial and social organization of the city. I will close
this chapter with a sub-conclusion on what these present day facts on the ground tells us about the ethno-
spatial strategies applied by the Municipality of Jerusalem.
3.2 Jerusalem – the central battle ground for politics, religion and nationalism
Jerusalem is hardly just another city or one more national capital. It is the declared capital of the Jewish
Israeli state and at the same time the designated capital of the supposed sovereign Palestinian state.
Representing a profoundly important issue for Palestinians and Israelis alike, it has figured as one of the
‘permanent status’ issues in the negotiations and proposed peace agreements between the two parties since
the DOP in 1993. For both people the city of Jerusalem constitutes an important element of their national
narratives making it almost impossible to imagine their nation without a connection to Jerusalem.
Consequently the city is one of the most contentious elements in the conflict. Further complicating the
matter, the city also represents the fault lines of the Israeli society and constitutes places of holiness to
Judaism, Christianity and Islam, making the city a focus of worldwide interest. All these contradictory
claims and conceptualizations of the city make it a central scene of conflict and demarcation.
The original set up according to the UNSOP and the Partition Plan of 1947 was to establish the city as a
corpus separatum under a special international regime administered by the United Nations. But following the
outbreak of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, where Jordan occupied the eastern part of the city and the Old
City, and Israel occupied the western part, the conceptualization of the city has been that of a de facto
divided city, even though there is no physical barrier separating the areas of the city (OCHA, 2011:6). In
1967 Israel conquered the West Bank, and the GOI declared that Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration
would apply to about 70 square kilometers of the incorporated Palestinian territories resulting in a de-facto
annexation of these areas, including East Jerusalem, to the state of Israel. The annexed area was subsequently
added to the Municipality of Jerusalem, whereby approximately 69,000 Palestinians came under Israeli rule
(Weizman, 2007:25). This form of annexation is considered illegal according to international law, since it is
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defined as a permanent acquisition and incorporation of a territorial entity into another entity or state (Kattan,
2008). The GOI has disputed this interpretation, claiming in the Basic Law on Jerusalem of 1980 the right to
the city “whole and united” as the exclusive capital of the Jewish State, which must “remain forever under
Israeli sovereignty”7. The Israeli assertion is directly contravening the claim of the Palestinians to East
Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state and has been rejected by the majority of the UN member
states through a number of Security Council resolutions (e.g. resolution 252, 267, 471, 476 and 478), where
it is stated that all legislative measures and actions taken by Israel to alter the character and status of
Jerusalem is null and void (OCHA, 2011:8).
Since the DOP in 1993, Jerusalem has figured as one of the four core or final status issues along with the
question of borders, refugees and security. The issues have been discussed throughout the last decade at
numerous peace and conflict resolution meetings and summits, without reaching any actual progress. One of
the obstacles to reach an agreement is the gap between the GOI’s stated commitments and its actual actions
in continuing its establishment of facts on the ground in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. This was
exemplified last year, when the GOI decided to build 3000 new settlement units in the disputed E1 zone as a
reaction to the UN decision to grant Palestine non-member observer status in November 20128. This incident
represents the close link between the overall political negotiations, the Palestinian quest for sovereignty and
the Holy city in the middle of it all. Furthermore it underpins the importance of understanding the actual
developments on the ground vis-à-vis the reality of the negotiation tables.
7 http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic10_eng.htm - 20. maj 2013
8 http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/3B24DAE5E93550CB85257AD3004F17E1 - 20.maj 2013
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The spatial development of Jerusalem from 1967 to 2005
(Source: OCHA, 2011: 9)
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3.3 Initial territorial strategies for Jerusalem
The geographical expansion of the city turned Jerusalem into Israel’s largest city with an area of 108,5
square kilometers and a population of 266,300 inhabitants (1967) according to the Foundation for Middle
East Peace, of which 74,2% were Jewish Israelis and 25,8% were Arab Palestinians9. The actual ethnic
composition of the city prior to the war of 1967 has in all probability been less unequal, since large numbers
of Palestinians fled the city for the West Bank when the war broke out. The controversy and struggle over
the demographic reality reflects one of the flanks of the conflict over the city, which is still at play today;
According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem was in 2011 home to 783,660 inhabitants, of
whom 590,750 were Israelis and 161,090 were Palestinians. For the same year the Jerusalem Institute for
Israel Studies asses a total of 801,000 inhabitants of whom 497,000 were Israelis and 281,000 Palestinians. I
will investigate the role of demography throughout the following empirical presentation, but relying here on
the numbers from the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, which is also
employed by OCHA, stating a demographic division of 63,9 percent Jews and others (504,179 persons) and
36 percent Palestinians (283,873 persons).
The enlargement of the territory of Jerusalem was designed by a military committee with the aim of
redrawing and expanding the borders of 1948, prior to any evacuation of the occupied territories in the event
of an international agreement, which could force Israeli to redraw from the Palestinian territories. The
visions for the development of Jerusalem was outlined in the 1968 Master plan instructing the enlargement
and unification of the city in a manner that would prevent the possibility of a future repartitioning (Weizman,
2007:25). This was expressed in the way the committee decided to set the borders, with more focus on
demographic than planning considerations. To ensure a significant Jewish majority, with the motive of
strengthen the Israeli sovereignty over the city, the borders were drawn so that they included empty areas for
the city’s expansion and excluded, as far as possible, the areas densely populated with Palestinians. The
result was that several Palestinian villages were placed outside the city, but their lands were included within
the city’s new borders, while other villages and neighborhoods were divided; one part remaining in the West
Bank and the other par annexed by Israel (B’tselem, 1995:8ff).
Jewish ‘neighborhoods’ were furthermore established on Palestinian territory and incorporated into the city,
whereby it created a belt of built fabric that enveloped and bisected the Palestinian neighborhoods. Industrial
zones were located beyond the new neighborhoods on the fringes of the municipal area, with the dual
purpose of creating a protective layer between the Israeli and Palestinian areas and placing the industrial
zones close to the Palestinian workers, but separating them from the city. Subsequently a second circle of
Israeli settlements was established beyond the municipal borders, extending the municipal borders of the city
9 http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/settlement-info-and-tables/stats-data/jerusalems-population-1967-2003 -
20. maj 2013
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even further, termed the ‘organic’ or second wall’ by the Israeli planners. In order to connect the dispersed
urban geography of the scattered new neighborhoods and the crooked borders of the municipality, a network
of roads and infrastructure was created, facilitating access and movement for the Israeli inhabitants and
hindering it for the Palestinian (Weizman, 2007:25ff).
These developments led to an Israeli dominated ‘Greater Jerusalem’ stretching into the West Bank reaching
Ramallah in the north, Bethlehem in the south and Jericho in the east. The expansion of the city was further
supported by the separation wall from 2002 annexing additional territory to the ‘Greater Jerusalem’ and
creating further isolation of the Palestinian areas of the city from the West Bank. The planned extension of
the barrier to encompass the disputed E1 area10 will include additional Palestinian territory to the Israeli
territory of Jerusalem and will constitute a physical barrier cutting horizontally through the West Bank
almost separating the northern and southern parts (Weizman, 2007:26). The E1 zone furthermore manifests
an additional physical barrier between the West Bank and Jerusalem and seems to be an important piece in
the Israeli puzzle for total control over the city. This is also reflected in the positioning of the settlements; an
estimated eighty per cent of the settler population in the West Bank lives within a 25 kilometer radius of
Jerusalem, most of them encircled and ‘protected’ by the separation barrier (OCHA, 2011:50).
3.4 The political and administrative organization of the city
As mentioned above, all of Jerusalem has been under Israeli rule and control since the annexation of 1967.
Following the annexation, the Israeli authorities conducted a census and granted permanent residency status
to the 66,000 Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem present at the time the census was conducted; persons
not present, for whatever reason, lost their right to reside in Jerusalem. Since the expanded boundaries of
‘Greater Jerusalem’ were cutting through Palestinian neighborhoods and villages the annexation created, and
is still upholding, a distinction between Palestinians previously living side by side; between those included in
the Israeli Jerusalem and those who were not, who continued to be residents of the West Bank and subject to
military rule11. Hence the territorial differentiations of the annexation concurrently created political and
social differentiations among the Palestinians.
3.4.1 Permanent residency status vs citizenship
The status of permanent residency differs substantially from the status of citizenship, granted all Israelis and
all Jews of the world, who conduct Aliyah cf. the Law of Return of 195012, where the citizenship is granted
10 Some parts of the barrier surrounding the E1 and Ma’ale Adumim have already been approved, while others need
to be finally approved before the establishment of the physical concrete barrier can be established. No matter what,
the area is already under Israeli control -
http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files/20110612_btselem_map_of_wb_eng.pdf
11 http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/legal_status - 20.maj 2013
12 The Law of Return is an Israeli legislation, passed on 5 July 1950, which gives Jews the right to return to the state of
Israel, where they can gain citizenship purely on the basis of their religious affiliation.
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purely on the basis of their religious affiliation. For Palestinians living in East Jerusalem and having the
status of permanent resident, it is possible to receive Israeli citizenship if meeting certain conditions,
including swearing allegiance to the State of Israel, renouncing any citizenship of another country and
proving some knowledge of Hebrew. Around 2,700 to 5,000 Palestinians living in East Jerusalem assumed
Israeli citizenship and Israeli passport just after the annexation, but most of the Palestinians rejected this
‘offer’ for political reasons (Klein, 2001:19). The numbers of Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem
applying for Israeli citizenship are still small – only hundreds per year, but in recent years there has been a
steady increase. From 2007-2011 about 3,000 Palestinians applied for Israeli citizenship and about 2,300
received it according to the Israeli Interior Ministry. The number of granted citizenships has increased each
year during that time, from 147 in 2006 to 690 in 2010 and according to the Interior Ministry roughly 5
percent of East Jerusalem’s Palestinian residents now hold Israeli citizenship13. In comparison 1,059,993
Jewish immigrants from all over the world were granted Israeli citizenship from 1990 to 2001 and from
2002-2010 the number was 181,23314.
The permanent residency granted to Palestinians living in East Jerusalem differs substantially from
citizenship; the primary right granted to permanent residents is to live and work in Israel without the
necessity of special permits, and it also gives entitlement to social benefits provided by the National
Insurance Institute and to health insurance. Permanent residents of Jerusalem hold Israeli identity cards and
can vote for the municipal elections, but not for the national elections for Knesset or for the prime minister.
Most of them do not use their vote in the Municipal elections as an act of resistance against the Israeli rule
and the discriminatory policies of the Municipality (Klein, 2001:19f). Permanent residency status is
furthermore not automatically transferred through marriage, so a Palestinian resident of East Jerusalem who
wishes to reside in the city with a spouse from the remainder of the Palestinian territories, must apply for
family unification. The application process for family reunification for residents of East Jerusalem is
troublesome and has become virtually impossible since 2003, when Israel introduced the Nationality and
Entry into Israel Law15 - a law issued in the middle of the political context of the Second Intifada, where the
Israeli mechanisms of control harden on a number of counts (Weizman, 2007:11). Only citizens are granted
the right to return to Israel at any time. Permanent residency also differs from citizenship on the right of the
holder’s children; permanent residency status is not passed on to the holder’s children ‘by right’, only when
the holder meets certain conditions, resulting in difficulties in registering the children of such ‘mixed
residency’ status marriages (OCHA, 2011:12ff)16
13 http://www.gov.il/FirstGov/TopNavEng/Engoffices/EngMinistries/ - 20. maj 2013
14 http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/shnaton/text_search_eng_new.html?CYear=2012&Vol=63&input=Immigration – 20.
maj 2013
15 http://www.adalah.org/eng/Articles/1556/Family-Unification - 20.maj 2013
16 http://www.btselem.org/family_separation/east_jerusalem - 20. maj 2013
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3.4.2 Revocation of residency status
Between December 1995 and March 2000, the Ministry of the Interior changed its policy regarding the
permanent residency granted the Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem without forewarning; an act seen by
most NGOs and organizations working in East Jerusalem as an additional method to attain the demographic
objective of reducing the number of Palestinians in the city17 18. The Ministry claimed that permanent
residency, unlike citizenship, is a matter of the circumstances in which the individual lives, and when these
circumstances change, the permit granting permanent residency expires. The Ministry demanded that in
order to keep the permanent residency status, every inhabitant had to prove that their ‘center of life’ was in
Jerusalem, requiring numerous and complex documentation. Thus, every Palestinian who lived outside the
city for a number of years or who could not prove that Jerusalem was the center of their life, lost their right
to live and work in the city as well as their social benefits, and was furthermore ordered by the Ministry to
leave their homes forever. The Israeli authorities never announced this change of policy and never warned
Palestinians that by leaving Jerusalem they were jeopardizing their status and right to return to live in their
homes in the city. As a consequence of this policy, the permanent residency of more than 3,000 Palestinians
living in East Jerusalem ‘expired’ in the years between 1995 and 200019.
In March 2000, following massive protest by international agencies and local NGO’s, the Minister of Interior
submitted an affidavit to the High Court of Justice, in which he proclaimed that the ‘quiet deportation policy’
would stop. However the Ministry of Interior has continued the policy and the revoking of the permanent
residency status of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem, particularly in cases where the persons in
question have been granted citizenship or permanent residency in another country. In 2008 the Ministry
revoked the residency status of 4,577 Palestinians, an all-time high number most likely connected to the
Israeli reprisal of the kidnapping of the Israeli soldier Gilat Shalit and the rocket and mortar fire from Gaza,
leading to the Israeli invasion of Gaza in December 2008. In 2011 the Ministry revoked the residency of 101
Palestinians. In total approximately 14,000 East Jerusalem Palestinians have had their residency status
revoked since 196720 21.
17 http://www.acri.org.il/en/category/east-jerusalem/citizenship-and-residency-east-jerusalem/
18 http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/revocation_of_residency - 20 maj 2013
19 http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/revocation_of_residency - 20.maj 2012
20 http://www.acri.org.il/en/category/east-jerusalem/citizenship-and-residency-east-jerusalem/ - 20. maj 2013
21 http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/revocation_of_residency - 20.maj 2013
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Settlements in the outskirts of Jerusalem
3.5 Settlements – in the annexed Palestinian areas of Jerusalem
Approximately 200,000 Israeli settlers are living in East Jerusalem. The act of transferring or deporting
persons into occupied territory, as Israel is defined by international law, is considered illegal as stated in the
statutory obligations of article 49, §6 of the Geneva Convention. Regardless the GOI has constructed
settlements within the extended municipal boundaries and in the wider metropolitan area of East Jerusalem
ever since 1967. The territory bought, expropriated or annexed for building or expanding the Israeli
settlements has resulted in a corresponding reduction in the land and resources available for the Palestinian
inhabitants for construction and development of the eastern part of the city. The settlement enterprise in East
Jerusalem as well as in the West Bank is consolidated on a number of practices, where the legal,
administrative and military divisions of the Israeli society are working together to promote their cause. I will
elaborate on how the practices of spatial distribution, land confiscation, building permits and house
demolitions work together in creating a certain political and demographic organization of the city.
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The term ‘settlements’ in the context of Jerusalem is often disputed by the Israeli authorities as well as most
of the Israeli public, who do not consider the establishment of Jewish neighborhoods build in the annexed
areas to be settlements even though they are characterizes as such by international law. This is areas such as
Gilo (housing 40,000 Israeli inhabitants), French Hill (housing 7,000 Israeli inhabitants) and Pisgat Ze’ev
(the largest residential area of Jerusalem housing more than 50,000 Israeli inhabitants22. Instead they claim
and uphold a narrative of a Jewish historical, cultural and religious legitimate right to the city.
The Israeli settlements in and around East Jerusalem are often carefully and strategically located and can
overall be divided into those situated in the immediate surroundings of Jerusalem, constituting the ‘first ring’
as for example East Talpiot, Ramat Alon and French Hill. Those situated in the ‘second ring’ in the wider
metropolitan area of Jerusalem as for example Ma’ale Adummim (situated in the disputed E1 zone east of
Jerusalem), Giv’at Ze’ev and Gush Etzion. And finally those situated in the center of the city in Palestinian
residential areas, surrounding the Old City Basin from the south, east and north. Some of them are positioned
on main roads leading to the Old City, strategically placed in order to control the movement along these
roads. Within the Old City, settlement enclaves have been established in the Muslim and Christian quarters,
with the objective of presence and control in the areas as well as in as much of the Old City as possible. The
settlements are furthermore established with the objective of surrounding the Temple Mount23, the most Holy
place in Jerusalem for the Jewish and Muslim religion alike24. I will describe these settlements in more detail
in the paragraph below.
22 http://eng.ir-amim.org.il/?CategoryID=339 – 20. maj 2013
23 http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/settler_enclaves - 20.maj 2013
24 The second intifada erupted when the at the time leader of the Israeli opposition Ariel Sharon insisted on visiting
the Muslim areas of the Temple Mount on September 28 2000.
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Location of settlements in around Jerusalem
Source: OCHA, 2011: 52
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Location of settlements within the Holy Basin
Source: OCHA, 2011: 55
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3.5.1 Settlements in the Old City
The settlements in the Old City can be said to constitute the ‘inner’ layer, situated in the midst of densely
populated Palestinian residential areas in the so-called ‘Holy Basin’ surrounding the Old City. The main
settlement enclaves in the Old City are in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City, in Silwan (the ‘Ir David’
settlement), in Ras al-‘Amud (the Ma’ale Zeitim and Ma’ale David settlements), in a-Tur (the Beit Orot
settlement), in Abu Dis (the Kidmat Zion settlement) and in Sheik Jarrah (the Nahalat Shimon settlement).
An estimated 2,000 settlers live in these enclaves (OCHA, 2011:53)25, which is often the centre of violent
friction and tensions between the settlers and their next door Palestinian neighbors. The settlements are
established in buildings and on land, which have been expropriated by means of the Absentee Property Law
(see below for further details on the law); on the basis of alleged prior Jewish ownership; in buildings
purchased from Palestinian owners, often through middle men hiding the fact that the new owners are
Israelis; and in residences custom-built and financed by settler organizations (OCHA, 2011:53)26. Due to the
complicated ownership dynamics in the Old City, where buildings are often passed on to future generations
and official documents and documentation is lacking, the allegations of prior Jewish ownership can be
difficult for the Palestinian inhabitants to dismiss27. The Absentee Property Law is an Israeli law from 1950,
which as all laws of the state of Israel, were applied to East Jerusalem following the annexation in 1967. The
purpose of the law was to transfer the property of the Palestinian refugees of 1948 to the state of Israel.
According to an amendment of the law in 1970, Palestinians who were physically present in East Jerusalem
at the time of the annexation would not be considered absentees; but for anyone who was not in the annexed
territory at the time, their property is considered absentee and can be appropriated by the Custodian of
Absentee Property. Meanwhile, the same law allows Jews to claim their property from before 1948 (as it is
happening in the Palestinian residential areas Silwan and Sheikh Jarrah), in clear national-ethnic
discrimination.
3.5.2. Organization and financing of the Old City settlements
The initiative and financing for establishing the settlement enclaves comes from wealthy settler organization,
especially founded by the American Jewish diaspora. The most active organizations are Ateret Cohanim
working in the Muslim quarter of the Old City, Elad working in Silwan and Nahlat Shimon working in Sheik
Jarrah. The American Friends of Ateret Cohanim sends millions of dollars every year to ‘redeem land’ in
East Jerusalem. In 2007 the organization transferred 1,6 million dollars to Ateret Cohanim in Jerusalem
(Klein, 2010:61). These organizations all subscribe to an ultra-nationalistic and aggressive Zionist ideology
with the primary objective to redeem the land in East Jerusalem in order to hand it ‘back’ to the Jewish
25 http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/settler_enclaves - 20. maj 2013
26 http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/settler_enclaves - 20. maj 2013
27 http://bimkom.org.il/eng/east-jerusalem/ - 20.maj 2013
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people. Furthermore through the establishment of physical structures and ‘irreversible’ facts on the ground
within the annexed area they aim to pre-empt a negotiated resolution to the question of Jerusalem. According
to the Israeli Committee against House Demolitions the settlers are intentionally aiming for controlling
strategic points in East Jerusalem in order to thwart any option of dividing the city and thereby also upsetting
the diplomacy’s applecart of a peace process (OCHA; 2011:53). The ideological element of this settlement
enterprise in the middle of the Old City is also manifested by the presence of educational and religious
institutions, archaeological excavations and visitor centers, which are meant to emphasize Jewish historical
narratives and connection to the given territory and thereby also exclude alternative narratives (ibid). I will
elaborate on the use of archaeology and open spaces as strategies for claiming land in the paragraph below,
which are some of the measure applied by the GOI and the Municipality of Jerusalem in order to support the
settler enclaves.  Other measures used by the GOI and the MOJ are the allocation of private security guards
paid for by taxes to protect the enclaves, sending security forces to accompany takeover of assets and houses,
founding and promoting building and development projects in the enclaves and transferring government
assets, such as the Archeological Garden around the Old City, to the control of the organizations28. In the
paragraph below I will elaborate on the factors and policies, which are facilitating the establishment of the
Jewish settlements.
3.6 Spatial distribution, land confiscation and population density
The spatial distribution in today’s Jerusalem is partly shaped by the settlement enterprise described above,
whereby the settlers are efficiently claiming and controlling land, intentionally reducing the land available
for the Palestinians in these areas and creating facts on the ground within the Palestinian territories. The
settlement enterprise is supported by a number of political and administrative measures, among these the
requirements for documentation of ownership of houses and the Absentee Property Law as described in the
paragraph on settlements in the Old City. The most distinctive about the spatial distribution in Jerusalem
except from the Israeli claiming of Palestinian land, is that most of the neighborhoods in East Jerusalem lack
appropriate, up-to-date local plans with sufficient area and adequate zoning provisions to meet the urgent
housing and development needs. Very few areas are zoned for business activity and commerce and none at
all for light industry. The absence of such plans, together with the ongoing difficulty in receiving building
permits, which I will elaborate on below, results in uncontrolled urban development, lack of homes and
buildings for institutions such as schools and community centers29. These chaotic conditions are on a number
of counts creating an environment in the city, which are getting more and more difficult for the Palestinians
to live in.
28 http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/settler_enclaves - 20. maj 2013
29 http://bimkom.org.il/eng/east-jerusalem/ - 21.maj 2013
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Zoning in East Jerusalem
Source: OCHA,2011:29
3.6.1 Land confiscation and national parks
The current planning of the residential areas in East Jerusalem is conducted without the involvement or
considerations for the local communities, but representing the Israeli interests rather well. This is for
example represented in the large percent of the areas designated as ‘open landscape areas’ on which building
and development is forbidden, including areas designated for national parks or archaeological excavations30.
These could be argued for by reference to the city’s historic and cultural inheritance, but since there is a large
disparity between the areas designated for such open landscape areas in West Jerusalem in comparison with
the much bigger magnitude of the areas in East Jerusalem, it suggest a deliberate strategy of seizing territory
conducted by the Israelis through the policies of the MOJ. By declaring public areas in Palestinian
neighborhoods for Israeli archeological sites and national parks the Israeli national and municipal authorities
are contributing to creating Israeli facts on the ground within Palestinian territory. Since it is some 40
percent of the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem that are declared open space, leaving only 11
percent of the land available for construction for the Palestinian residents, these administrative measures
conducted by the MOJ and national bodies such as the Israeli Antiquities Authority of creating facts on the
ground is quiet influential. The spatial distribution results in a limited area available for building and
developing the Palestinian neighborhoods and a higher housing and population density within the established
neighborhoods; in the end of 2002 the housing density in the Palestinian neighborhoods was almost twice
30 http://eng.ir-amim.org.il/?CategoryID=269 – 21.maj 2013
29
that of Jewish neighborhoods with 11,9 square meters pr person compared to 23,8 square meters per
person31.
Until 2001 the GOI and the MOJ had only planned one national park in the Holy Basin, the Jerusalem Walls
National Park, surrounding the Old City walls. Following the second intifada a second national park was
established, Emek Tzurim, and an intentional strategy of designating areas for national parks took form,
leading the GOI in close cooperation with settler organizations to outline a plan to surround the Old City
with nine national parks, gardens, paths and sites intended to change the status quo in the city and strengthen
the Jewish affiliation and thereby demonstrate ownership to the Old City and its surrounding territories. The
plan seeks to create a territorial contiguity of Jewish historic site and connect them to strategic settlements
around Jerusalem, including the Ben Hinnom Valley in the south, Mount Zion, City of David in Silwan,
Mount of Olives, Jerusalem Walls, King’s Valley, Zedekiah’s Cave, Garden of the Tomb, Emek Tzurim, the
Qidron Salient and Mount Scopus, connecting at its end to the E1 area north of Ma’ale Adumim.
In addition to the underlying motive for these national parks, taking territory and available land from the
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem, and manifesting the Jewish presence in the city, this plan for the
development of national parks, also shows the direct role and support of the GOI to the settlement enterprise
and its leading organizations. By granting the settler organizations the control of the national parks and their
future, they are given an increasingly important role in the administration and development of some of the
most important sites in Jerusalem.  The settler organizations are thereby given green light to promote and
pursue their agenda of banishing the Palestinians from Jerusalem and its surroundings, which by time will
change the balance of control in control in the Old City.  The administrative and political support of the
settler organizations is also evident in the transfer of funds from government agencies to the projects of the
settlers association, which is taking place more or less openly; it is for example reflected in the tourist budget
for Jerusalem, which increased by 266 per cent from 2009 to 2010 from 3 million nis to 8 million nis to
which the MOJ additionally raised 10 million nis from the government to the tourist budget adding up to an
overall tourism budget of about 18 million nis corresponding US $4,870,573 (Klein, 2010:65). Since tourism
services, infrastructure and sights are well-developed in West Jerusalem, it is likely that these funds are
meant for developing Israeli tourism projects in East Jerusalem and in the settlements in the Holy Basin e.g.
in Silwan and on the Mount of Olives.
Archaeological excavations have also been an important instrument of control since Israel gained control
of East Jerusalem in 1967. Since then, the Israeli Antiquities Authority or various Israeli universities have
initiated all excavations in the Old City and its environs. Following government budget cuts, private players,
especially the settler organizations, began to take part in excavations. The Elad organization, for example,
31 http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/discriminating_policy - 20. maj 2013
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which is active in settling many Jewish families in the Palestinian neighborhood of Silwan, is employed as a
subcontractor of the Israeli government to administer the archaeological site City of David, which also
houses several settlers. Elad developed the project and the City of David National Park, today one of the
most visited sites in Jerusalem. Elad also initiated additional archaeological excavations in Silwan, including
digging a tunnel that is supposed to connect the City of David with the Temple Mount. These excavations
often run under the homes of Palestinian residents without their knowledge, causing heavy damage to private
and public property in the village32. Hence the archeological excavations are also demonstrating how the
conflict is not only concerned and manifested in the horizontal levels of the city, but also in the vertical
levels of the city, where the conflicting claims and narratives also relates to the underground with its
possibilities of claiming land and finding historical artifacts supporting the parties connection the specific
space and land.
3.6.2 Building permits and house demolitions
In Jerusalem and in the 60 percent of the West Bank controlled by Israel, known as Area C, Israel is
conducting a widespread practice of demolishing homes, basic infrastructure and sources of livelihoods.
According to UNWRA these practices of demolition are in fact practices of displacement and
dispossession33. The demolitions are often affecting already poor families and are leading to a significant
deterioration in living conditions for the families and community affected. Families face long-term instability
and for those forced to move from East Jerusalem whereby they are giving up their permanent resident
status, it is also affecting their access to insurance, health care and basic services such as education34.  The
Israeli Committee against House Demolitions estimates that some 27,000 Palestinian structures have been
demolished in the Palestinian Territories including East Jerusalem since the annexation in 196735.
In order to build homes in East Jerusalem and Area C, Palestinians must apply for a permit from the Israeli
authorities, who control these areas. But as described in the paragraph above, many areas lack an official
zoning plan, which means that residents cannon secure building permits. The vast majority of demolition
orders are issued because a home or structure has been built without an Israeli permit. Building without a
permit means that the structure is considered “illegal” by Israeli authorities. Under the Israeli zoning policy,
Palestinians can build in just 11 per cent of East Jerusalem and in just 1 per cent of Area C. In both cases
these areas are already heavily built up. Ultimately, the number of permits granted to Palestinians each year
falls far below the demand. More than 94 per cent of all Palestinian permit applications have been rejected in
recent years. This means that when a family expands or a community wants to build infrastructure to meet its
32 http://eng.ir-amim.org.il/?CategoryID=269 – 21. maj 2013
33 http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=1001 – 21. maj 2013
3434 http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=1001 – 21.maj 2013
35 http://www.icahd.org/the-facts - 21. maj 2012
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basic needs, the choice faced is between building without a permit, or not building at all. Many end up
building to meet their immediate needs in the hope that they will be able to avoid demolition. Sadly, the
number of people affected by demolition continues to grow. The UN estimates that between 28 and 46 per
cent of Palestinian homes could be at risk of demolition, creating insecurity and instability for the families
affected36.
Furthermore the existing situation force many Palestinians, who does not want to leave the city, to build
homes without first obtaining a building permit,  whereby the buildings face the threat of demolition and the
families to lose their homes. According to the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied
Territories, the MOJ enforces the building laws on Palestinians much more stringently than on the Jewish
population and especially the settlers, even though the number of violations is much higher in the Jewish
neighborhoods of Jerusalem37.
36http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=1001
37 http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/discriminating_policy - 21. maj 2013
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Demolitions in and around East Jerusalem
Source: OCHA, 2011:37)
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3.7 Municipal services an allocation of resources
The residents of East Jerusalem are required to pay taxes like all city residents. But when it comes to the
services provided by the MOJ their benefits are nothing like their neighbors in the western part of the city.
The Jewish and the Palestinian areas in the city are not separated by concrete physical barriers, but instead
clearly differentiated and marked by the living standards in each area. When entering a Palestinian
neighborhood from a Jewish this is clearly manifested by the deterioration of the road, the lack of sideways,
the trash floating next to the streets – all evidence of the lacking municipal services. Since the annexation of
Jerusalem, the Municipality has built almost no new school, public building, or medical clinic for
Palestinians and the MOJ has continuously failed to invest significantly for infrastructure and services such
as roads, sidewalks, water and sewage systems in Jerusalem's Palestinian neighborhoods38.
The neighborhood of Silwan, East Jerusalem
38 http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/infrastructure_and_services - 21.maj 2013
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Less than 10 percent of the Municipality’s development budget is allocated for Palestinian neighborhoods,
although the population there represents a third of the city’s residents. This neglect is clearly manifested in
the lack of investment in infrastructure, which has left East Jerusalem in a deteriorated state with entire
Palestinian neighborhoods not connected to a sewage system and without paved roads and sidewalks. When
it comes to general basic services and facilities in the city there is also a clear unfair treatment of the
Palestinian areas; almost 90 percent of the sewage pipes, roads and sidewalks are found in West Jerusalem,
West Jerusalem has 1,000 public parks and East Jerusalem has 45, West Jerusalem has 34 swimming pools,
East Jerusalem has three, West Jerusalem has 25 libraries and East Jerusalem has two and West Jerusalem
has 531 sports facilities, where East Jerusalem only has 3339.
The lack of basic service is clear in the case of the Shufat Ridge neighborhoods outside the Shu’fat Refugee
camp. There are close to 10,000 residents in this area, which suffers from a severely underdeveloped
infrastructure: few and poorly paved roads, little or no trash collection, and the complete absence of street
lamps or landscaping. There are no municipal schools, no parks, no community centers, and no post office.
No zoning plan exists for the neighborhoods, so the residents have no means by which to secure building
permits. Police service is limited at best and since 2000 (due to security concerns) both ambulances and fire-
trucks have demanded police escort in order to enter the area resulting in severe delays. The area only has
only health clinic. In comparison, the neighboring Israeli settlement Pisgat Ze’ev, which is home to some
45,000 residents, have 14 schools, 6 health clinics, one mother and child centre, and one community center
with two branches, as well as modern roads, street lamps, parks, and landscaping. Residents enjoy the
benefits of approved zoning plans, and of police, fire protection, and emergency medical services.
3.8 Sub-conclusion; the ethno-spatial organization of Jerusalem
Even if there is no physical barrier between the Jewish Israeli areas and the annexed Palestinian areas, as the
assessment of the case of Jerusalem suggests, the city is marked and organized by a number of dividing lines.
The GOI and the MOJ have created a number of facts on the ground in the city constituted by the Israeli
settlements in the ‘municipal’ and ‘metropolitan’ area as well as in the core of the city; the Old City and the
Holy Basin.
The settlement enterprise in the Old City is affecting the demographic, political and social organization of
space in the city on a number of counts; firstly it establishes Jewish presence and homes in the Palestinian
areas of the city. In the most severe cases – in the Old City, Silwan, and most recently Sheikh Jarrah – settler
expropriation has resulted in the loss of property and the eviction of the long-term Palestinian residents.
39 http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/infrastructure_and_services - 21.maj 2013
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Secondly the large amount of territory expropriated for settlement construction in the Jerusalem area results
in a corresponding reduction in the land and resources available for Palestinian residential and commercial
growth. The settlements, both ‘municipal’ and ‘metropolitan’, have been integrated into the urban fabric,
provided with modern infrastructure and services, and supported by a planning and zoning framework which
allows for their residential expansion. This is in contrast to Palestinian neighborhoods of East Jerusalem
where municipal services do not meet the requirements of the residents, and where a serious housing
shortage exists as a result of the failure to provide these communities with adequate planning. Thirdly the
policy of the MOJ of designating places for archaeological excavations and open spaces is putting additional
constrain on Palestinian construction and space in East Jerusalem. And finally the settlement activity restricts
the Palestinians freedom of movement within their own neighborhoods and constitutes restrictions on their
everyday life and level of security. The settlers and their security guards intimidate and discriminate the
Palestinian residents and cause restriction on their movement; for example ordering which roads to take, how
close to get to the settler homes, where the children can play etc. In addition the Palestinian residents
experience discrimination by the policy and if friction occurs between the settlers and the Palestinians, the
police frequently protect only the rights of the Israeli settlers40.
These factors are together creating an environment in the city, where the daily life of the Palestinians is
severely restricted and complicated, jointly constituting a number of push-factors deliberately aiming  at
pushing the Palestinians out of Jerusalem and thereby creating a sole Jewish presence in the city. Looking
only at the actual organization of space on the ground, the reality seems very far away from the suggested
peace agreements at the political negotiation tables; because of the magnitude of the Israeli presence in the
Palestinian areas as well as the bifurcated network of administrative, social and political policies and
practices at all levels of the Israeli society which are supporting the current development of the city of
Jerusalem.
40 http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/settler_enclaves - 20. maj 2013
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4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK – TERRITORY
4.1 Introduction – Entering the territory of territory
This chapter will present a theoretical exposition of the notion of territory in order to establish a conceptual
framework through which I will analyze the strategies of Israel in the Palestinian territories through the case
study of Jerusalem.
In the field of Global Studies (GS) and International Relations (IR) the territorial states have been seen as the
most significant expressions of territoriality in the modern world. The international system of states and their
associated boundaries and power struggles have been the main subjects of analysis, making territory a key
concern for especially the field of IR and at the same time distinguishing its identity from that of political
science. In the field of IR a particular conception of territory has dominated; that of territoriality as a spatial
expression of the idea of an exclusive sovereignty (cf. the Treaty of Westphalia) bound to the notion of
sovereignty as a particular form of power (Krasner, 1999).  According to Delaney IR theory assumes a
particular conception of territory (as clear, closed and fixed) at the same time as it tends to render territory in
strongly dichotomous terms by way of mapping order/chaos, identity/difference, presence/absence,
politics/power and so on onto the lines and spaces through which global social life becomes intelligible
(Delaney, 2005:37). Behind this simplification lies different scientific approaches within the field of IR,
mainly the differences between the ‘realists’ and the ‘idealists’. In general terms the realists can be said to
view the global territorial system as composed of mutually exclusive spatially defined sovereigns, organized
on a flat two-dimensional mapping of power. Idealists can then be said to imagine a territorialization of
world power that is layered and where sovereign territories are constitutive components of a global
community of states composing a sort of mega territory (Delaney, 2005:38). In the following exposition I
will apply a concept of territory mainly inspired by critical IR theory and critical geopolitics as well as post-
structuralism seeing territory as embedded in a historical, cultural and political context stressing and
denaturalizing the relationship between territory and power, meaning and experience.
4.2 What is territory – and what is it for?
The principle of territorial integrity, understood as the absence of territorial violation, is one of the most
fundamental principles of international law. In the field of international relations, territory marks the lines of
sovereignty among the territorial states and thereby defines and delineates the workings of their power.
There are many ways in which territorial integrity can be compromised; the most obvious and devastating is
the destruction associated with warfare, occupation and annexation. One of the more common explanations
of territory – or the territorial state – is that it is a means of providing security for those ´inside´ from ever-
present dangers located ´outside´. Undoubtedly territory and territorial demarcations often serve this purpose,
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but at the same time territory has been the cause for many violent conflicts and the reason for loss of lives,
homes and land for many hundreds of thousands of people (Delaney, 2005:1).Just looking at the 20th century,
a time where the territorial nation-state achieved global hegemony as the sole ‘legitimate’ political
institution, shows us numerous examples of wars, which has been directly or indirectly (by rhetorical
justification) related to territory e.g. the genocidal massacre of the Kurdish people by the Iraqi state, the
Balkan wars or the ongoing conflict between the Palestinian and Israeli people. These examples make it
questionable whether security claims rooted in the principle of territorial integrity are the sole explanations at
play. At the same time these events demonstrate that even in the modern, globalized world, where social,
political and economic processes are no longer enclosed to the territorial nation state, territory is still a vital
element when understanding conflicts and processes among states. And even the modern form of territory
and territoriality are essential for our way of organizing ourselves in and throughout the modern world.
Delaney (2005) explains the function of territory in this way;
“Territoriality is an important element of how human associations – cultures, societies, smaller collectives –
and institutions organize themselves in space. It is an aspect of how individual humans, as embodied beings,
organize themselves with respect to the social and material world. Territories, then, are significant cultural
artifacts of a rather special kind” (Delaney, 2005:10).
This interpretation of the notion of territory and territoriality differs from the one traditionally expressed
within IR theory and geopolitics, since it does not see territory as containers for people or as means for
politics and power. I will elaborate on this perspective on territory in the paragraph below.
4.3 Seeing territory as socially and politically embedded
In this paper I am applying a notion of territory and territoriality derived from critical IR theory and critical
geopolitics. Inspired by general trends within the critical branches of different scientific theoretical bases as
well as post-structuralism, this approach sees territory as embedded in a given political, economic and
cultural context – and not as a given or natural part of human life. Instead territory is seen as a social product
created by humans throughout time and as a result of diverse social processes. This perspective has several
consequences for how we understand territory, the processes going on within and in relation to a particular
territory and for how I will conduct my analysis in this paper. (This is for example D.Newman, J. Agnew, G.
Ó Tuathail and Henri Lefebvre).
Firstly, this perspective sees territory as embedded in a particular context, where the territory and the context
are mutually constitutive and interconnected. Thus a given context shapes our notion of a given territory. The
idea of the territorial state as natural and unchangeable in thereby rejected, opening up for a more dynamic
analysis of the processes and practices through which territorial forms emerge and are transformed (Delaney,
2003:12). As mentioned, earlier particular territorializations have throughout history frequently been
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contested. But an important aspect of how territoriality has worked is through its status as a taken for granted
part of how we organize ourselves on a global and local level. Similarly to how the notions of for example
race and gender have worked throughout history. But as with race and gender, the notion of territory and the
current manifestations of territoriality can be questioned, as we have seen with the break with the colonial
past, racialized territories and which can possible happen in Israel and Palestine. The first step on the way is
to see behind the naturalized manifestations of territorializations, acknowledge their political and constructed
character and dare to question their arguments of legitimacy.
Secondly, the critical perspective also reject the idea of territory as a container for humans and their social
life, since the notion of territory is seen as fundamentally constitutive of the social orders whose features
they express. In that way the social is in part what it is through how it is territorialized and it is implicated in
ways of thinking, acting and being in the world (Delaney, 2005:10). History shows us a continuous re-
territorialization of social life, which in the modern and post-modern times can be observed in how some
forms of identity and ways of being are directly tied to these territorial operations, e.g. the citizen, the settler,
the alien, the native, the refugee, the squatter etc (ibid: 11). This is a useful insight in relation to Israel and
Palestine and the analysis of how territorial strategies and configurations have influences the people and their
perceived connection to the land.
Thirdly, this critical post-structuralist perspective allows us to see the play of power and politics in the
formation and maintenance of territory. The traditional approaches within IR and geopolitics see territory
and the associated notion of sovereignty and the territorial nation state as a strategy for control of space and
people. This leads to a rather static view of the territory, which can be accused of seeing territory as a
product rather than a process. Instead the critical approach highlights the dynamic and contextual character
of territory, where territorial configurations according to Delaney (2005) is seen as political achievements
(Delaney, 2005:12). He explains the necessity of this perspective in this way;
“ [When territory]…or any given manifestation of it – is seen as contingent, socially constructed,
ideologically informed, and, when push comes to shove, enforced by physical violence, then the forms of
power which are inherently connected to territory may become more visible, and justifications, more clearly
partial or partisan”. (Delaney, 2005:11).
Nowhere does it seem more necessary to keep this effect of power and embedded claims of legitimacy and
its territorial manifestations in mind than in the case of Israel and Palestine. I will apply the above
characterizes critical perspective in the following analysis.
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5. CHARACTERIZING THE ISRAELI PRESENCE IN THE PALESTINIAN
TERRITORIES
5.1 Introduction
This chapter will present a theoretical conceptualization of the Israeli state and its presence in the Palestinian
territories. The assessment will mainly use the writing of Oren Yiftachel and his notion of ethnocracy. The
theoretical and conceptual framework will be discussed in the following analysis, where this framework will
be applied on the case of Jerusalem.
5.2 Characterizing the Israeli state
According to the Israeli government, the Israeli state is a parliamentary democracy41. On the admission of
Israel to the UN in 1494, the General Assembly stated that ‘Israel is a peace-loving State which accepts the
obligations contained in the Charter and is able and willing to carry out those obligations’42. Since then the
expansionist ambitions of Israel and its conduct against Palestinians residing in Israel and the Palestinian
territories, have led the international community to issue numerous resolutions and condemnations of its
actions. Today many scholars, intellectuals and politicians raise doubt about the democratic nature of the
Israeli society and state project (e.g. Yiftachel (2006), Davies (2003), Pappe (2006)).
Israel-proper can be said to qualify as a political democracy on many counts. These include universal voting
rights, a multi-party system, fair elections, change of governments, civil rights, independent judiciary, free
press, civilian authority over the army, and popular and elite support for democratic institutions43. But at the
same time a distinctive lack of democracy is also evident, not only in the actions of the state (e.g.
discrimination of minorities inside Israel proper, political supported stratification of the society as well as the
Israeli presence and military control of the West Bank), but also embedded in the structure of the state. The
Israeli professor of sociology, Sammy Smooha, defines Israel as an ethnic democracy and states that when
Israel is claiming to be both a democratic and a Jewish state, it is in fact a proclamation of being an ethnic
democracy. According to Smooha, Israel is a special case of an ethnic state, defining itself as the homeland
of and for the Jews, and in its preferential treatment to Jews who wish to preserve the embedded
‘Jewishness’ and Zionism of the state44 (Smooha, 2002: 202). Other scholars have similarly pointed to this
embedded contradiction within the Israeli state as expressed by the Israeli professor of sociology, Erik Cohen
(1989); ‘Israel wants to be a Jewish nation-state; as a nation-state, its fundamental legitimization was
41 http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/State/THE+STATE-+Political+Structure.htm – 20.april 2013
42 http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/83E8C29DB812A4E9852560E50067A5AC - 20 april 2013
43 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world - 20 april 2013
44 I will elaborate on these discriminatory practices in the chapters on Israel’s strategies of territorial control and the
chapter on its implementation and Israel’s system of control.
40
conceived in terms of particularistic Jewish national symbols; but as a modern civil nation state, its
fundamental legitimization was conceived in terms of the universalistic precepts of democratic freedom and
equality before the law of all citizens’ (ibid).
Other scholars and theorists have pointed to the Israeli control system in the West Bank (and to some extent
also in Israel proper), stating the incoherence between this and a democracy (Hajjar, 2005 & Kimmerling,
1989). In his book ‘The Israeli State and Society: Boundaries and Frontiers’ Kimmerling noted that the
Occupied Territories are more a part of Israel than separated from it, which lead him to conduct an
interesting study of the Israeli occupation as a system, that Israel simultaneously manages and is affected by.
Klein (2010) has to some extent followed the same line of thinking, maintaining that Israel operates a regime
that includes and excludes the Palestinians under its rule via a graduated system of controls (Klein,
2010:18f). According to Klein, Israel combines the imperatives of ethnicity and security to enforce an ethno-
security regime in the entire area from Jordan to the Mediterranean. But at the same time the Israeli state
maintains civil rights and operates its security forces in a differential way. These limits on the power of
ethnicity and security, enables Israel to present itself as a democracy, and to sustain the system (ibid).
5.2.1 Israel – an ethnocracy?
Another useful analysis of the Israeli state is conducted by the renowned Israeli professor in geography and
urban studies Oren Yiftachel. Like Klein, Yiftachel (2006) highlights the duplicity of the political system and
rule in Israel/Palestine45; on one hand conducting a full scale occupation and oppression of a people while on
the other hand keeping up appearances as a modern democratic state. In his book ‘Ethnocracy’ Yiftachel
presents a comprehensive critical theory to account for his notion of ethnocracy and the specific features of
such regimes.  According to Yiftachel, the best way to grasp the structure and processes of the Israeli society,
is by the concept of ethnocracy. An ethnocracy, or an ethnocratic regime, is a particular regime type, which
facilitates the expansion, ethnicization and control of a dominant ethnic nation (the charter group) over
contested territory and polity (Yiftachel, 2006:11). An ethnocracy is shaped by interconnected historical and
political factors shaping a specific territory and politics of the regime – mainly the intersection and fusion of
the three forces; colonialism, nationalism and capitalism.  The main goal of this type of regime is to
maximize ethnic control over a contested multiethnic territory and its governing apparatus. Ethnocracy
develops when control over territory is challenged and when a dominant group is powerful enough to
determine the character of the state (Yiftachel, 2006:15f).
45 I will in this chapter deploy the term Israel/Palestine when referring to the state of Israel following the notion of
Yiftachel that the current state of affairs of the Israeli occupation has led to an interrelated regime divided into
different zones, but not constituted by two nation states.
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Key principles characterize an ethnocratic regime;
 Ethnicity, and not territorial citizenship, is the main determinant of the allocation of rights, powers
and resources – even though the regime has declared itself democratic. Politics is often characterized
by constant democratic-ethnocratic tensions.
 State borders and political boundaries are blurred. There are no clear demos, due to the active role of
ethnic diasporas and the bounded, unequal citizenship of ethnic minorities.
 A dominant ‘charter’ ethnoclass appropriates the state apparatus and determines the outcome of most
public policies.
 Segregation and stratification practices are widespread.
 The socio-economic sphere is marked by longtime ethnoclass stratification.
 The logic of ethnic segregation is diffused into the social and political system.
 Civil and political rights are extended to members of the minority ethnoclass / ethnonation –
distinguishing ethnocracies from apartheid or authoritarian regimes.
(Yiftachel, 2006:16)
A central point regarding Israel/Palestine as an ethnocracy is the notion of the demos (the community of
equal resident citizens), which is severely ruptured. Equal rights and a coherent state of all citizens are not
high on the political agenda in Israel/Palestine, nor a part of the country’s imagination, symbols or resource
distribution. Israel/Palestine is also characterized by blurred boundaries of the state and politics, due to a
number of interrelated factors; the territorial/ethnic project in the West Bank, unequal citizenship of ethnic
minorities (e.g. the status of ‘permanent resident’ given to Palestinians in annexed East Jerusalem) as well as
the active role of ethnic Diasporas. According to Raymond (2011) the activity of the Jewish Diaspora and the
Jewish settlements have “been two of the most important building blocks upon which Israeli sovereignty was
created’ (Raymond, 2011;5). The role of the Diaspora is both political and economic, working in Israel
through organizations like Gush Emunim (Block of Faithful) and the Elad organization (To the City of
David), with huge influence on the judaization46 project in Jerusalem. The Diaspora also works
internationally, especially in the United States, where the population of Americans religious adherents of
Judaism was estimated to be approximately 6,489,000 in 200847 – outnumbering the Israeli Jewish
population of 5,664,000 in 200848. The Israel lobby in the United States has tremendous influence on the
American foreign policy (as shown by Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) and Stephens (2006)). The Diaspora is
46 Judaization refer to a process of cultural assimilation in which a person or a demographic group
acquires Jewish cultural and religious beliefs and values. It is used as a deliberate strategy in Jerusalem in order to
exclude the Palestinians in East Jerusalem and to create a Jewish ‘United Jerusalem’. I will elaborate on this in the
chapter on strategies of territorial control.
47 US Census Bureau Statistical, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2009/tables/09s0074.pdf- 12. December 2012
48 Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2008, Table 2.2. cbs.gov.il
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also a key ingredient in the Zionist project, which relies on immigration from abroad in order to uphold the
demographic and ethnic balance in Israel.
Another central point is the connection between ethnonationalism and religion in Israel. As presented above
one of the main forces behind ethnocracies is ethnonationalism. The role of religion is central due to the
interconnectedness of ‘the national’ and religion, which in most ethnocratic regimes are institutionalized and
politicized. Furthermore the religion is often an ethnic religion, held by the dominant group (Yiftachel,
2006:17). This is explicit in the case of Israel/Palestine, where the religion is embedded in the Declaration of
Independence, stating that Israel is a Jewish state for the Jews. The ‘Jewishness’ is also embedded on all
levels and structures of the society for example manifested in the Aliyah (right to return) or the recent
rejection on May 19, 2012, of a bill that would have legalized civil marriages in the country49
While recognizing that democratic states might not achieve full equality of its demos, the demos forms
according to Yiftachel, a necessary basis for the establishment of democracy pointing to the structural
tensions inherent in the construction of ethnocracies versus democracies (Yiftachel, 2006:16). These
structural tensions tend to generate long-term political instability, generally relating to the three features of
the ethnocracy; the central role of religion, the various levels of ethnic affiliation, and the structural obstacles
to state legitimacy (ibid). I will elaborate on the stability and sustainability of the Israeli regime in the
following analysis.
5.2.2 The Creation of the Ethnocracy
According to According to Yiftachel the creating of the regime occurs when there is a time-space
intersection between the following factors; a) the formation of a (colonial) settler society, b) the mobilizing
power of ethnonationalism, and c) the ethnic logic of capital (Yiftachel, 2006:12). The fusion of these factors
in Israel/Palestine has according to Yiftachel resulted in the establishment of an Israeli ethnocracy and has
determined its specific features. In the following sections I will elaborate on the notion of Israel as a settler
society and an ethnocracy, on ethnonationalism and the socio-spatial structures in Israel/Palestine. Due to
space limitations, I will not deal with the ethnic logic of capital, but just mention that the economy of
Israel/Palestine, as well as the political system, has an embedded logic of ethnoclasses constituting the
stratification and segregation of the society50.
Finding its historical legitimization of its strategies in the European migration and colonial enterprises, the
settler society pursues a strategy of immigration and settlement, migrating to another country, where they
49 http://jurist.org/paperchase/2012/05/israel-parliament-rejects-civil-marriage-bill.php - 12. December 2012
50 The ethnic logic of capital – both inside Israel proper and in Israel/Palestine – could well be the subject of an
independent paper. See for example Klein (2010) and http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-
relations/countries/palestine/. According to Yiftachel the setting of a settler society in Israel/Palestine combined with
ethnonationalism create a specific logic of capital flow, development, and class formation (Yiftachel, 206:14).
43
deliberately try to alter the ethnic structure and demographic balance. The strategy can be applied both on a
national as well as a regional basis. In all types of settler societies a ‘frontier culture develops’ (Yiftachel,
2006:13), whereby the settlers glorify and fortify the settlements as well as expand the control of the
dominant group in the settlement into neighboring regions (ibid.). The settler societies are often
characterized by stratification into ethnoclasses, where three main classes often can be identified; (a) a
founding charter group, (b) a group of later immigrants from different cultural backgrounds and (c)
dispossessed indigenous groups. In recent times a fourth group of foreign works can be added (Yiftachel,
2006:14). The settler society often exhibit two additional characteristic features; firstly an institutionalized
and systematized determination of the dominance of the charter group, where the stratification of the society
is incorporated in the political and economic system, whereby the power distribution is reproduced for
generations. Secondly, extraterritorial ethnic links with political and economic importance are often crucial
for the success of the colonial project, relying heavily on support and immigration from external sources as a
key mechanism in maintaining their dominance over minority groups. The extraterritorial links typically
connect the settler society to a co-ethnic metropolitan state or supportive ethnic Diasporas (ibid.)
When applying Yiftachel’s characterization to Israel and the OPT it is evident, that the Israeli Jewish
community is a key example of what he characterizes as a settler society. The Zionists in Israel have pursued
the strategy of settlement in two rounds; the first inside Israel proper and the second in the occupied
territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. After 1917 and the Balfour declaration (see chapter 3), the
Zionist movement applied a more aggressive strategy and stated a clear objective of a Jewish national state in
the area of the British Mandate. Their practice included international lobbying as well as a deliberate strategy
of immigration and settlement in the Mandate Territory – mainly inside Israel proper (Engel, 2009 and
Yiftachel, 2006). Since then altering the ethnic structure and the demographic balance have been some of the
main goals for the Zionists and the government of Israel combined with territorial expansion and annexation
(Stockmarr, 2012 & Klein, 2010). In this process the Israeli society is demonstrating the second
characteristic feature of a settler society – relying on extraterritorial ethnic links with political and economic
importance as well as on the Diaspora, in order to provide immigrants to uphold the colonial project.
Following the 1967 occupation, the Zionists and the Israeli government expanded its settlement strategy to
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in violation of international law and the Geneva Convention. In the
decades to come, the magnitude of the settlements expanded massively, prompted by religious-Zionist
incentives as well as a variety of government strategies (Yiftachel, 2006:64ff). In the official and public
discourses there is a distinct articulation of what Yiftachel calls ‘a frontier culture’, glorifying and fortifying
the settlements.
In accordance with Yiftachel’s notion of ethnoclasses, another central feature of the society in
Israel/Palestine is the distinct stratification and segregation of different ethnic groups. The dominant class is
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constituted by the Israeli Jewish Ashkenazi founding group (originating from West and Central Europe) and
its descendents, which has had and continues to have a dominant position in the most societal spheres: the
economy, culture, academia, politics, the legal system and professional associations (Yiftachel, 2006:113ff).
Other ethnoclasses are constituted by the Mizrahim (originating from North Africa and the Middle East), the
Bedouins, the Palestinians residing inside Israel proper (in the Israeli discourse referred to as Israeli Arabs)
and the Palestinians residing in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip – in Yiftachel’s terms the dispossessed
indigenous groups. During the last three centuries new groups have emerged such as the Russian-speaking51,
the African immigrants from Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan52, as well as the non-Jewish immigrant workers
mainly from Asia (Lewin-Epstein & Semynov, 2004). According to the ADVA Center (Information on
Equality and Social Justice in Israel) the southern Bedouins are the most deprived group in socio-economic
terms, followed by the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip53.  As pointed out by the two Israeli
sociologist Lewin-Epstein & Semynov (2004) there are also a clear segregation along religious lines inside
the Israeli society, between groups such as the the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox), the Zionist Jews and the secular
(ibid).
5.2.3 The mobilizing power of ethnonationalism and the notion of ‘Homeland’
According to Yiftachel, ethnonationalism, as a set of ideas and practices, constitutes one of the most
powerful forces to have shaped the world’s political geography in general and that of Israel/Palestine in
particular. He defines ethnonationalism as a political movement with the aim of achieving or preserving
ethnic statehood based on two principles of political order; the post-Westphalia division of the world into
sovereign states, and the principle of ethnic self-determination as enshrined in the 1945 United Nations
Charter.  The dominance of the ethnonational concept generates forms of ethnic territoriality, that perceive
control over ‘homeland’ territory and its defense as central to the survival of the group in question, often
51 Russian Jewish immigration to Israel began en masse in the 1990s when the liberal government of Mikhail
Gorbachev opened the borders of the USSR and allowed Jews to leave the country for Israel. Overall, about one million
Russians immigrated to Israel during this period, about 300,000 of whom were not Jewish according to rabbinical law,
but were eligible for Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return.
52 Undocumented workers from Africa in Israel (sometimes referred to as ‘infiltration from Africa to Israel’ by the Israeli
media and by Israeli government organizations) refer to a phenomenon that began in the second half of the 2000s in
which a large number of undocumented workers from Africa entered Israel illegally, mainly through the fenced border
between Israel and Egypt. According to the data of the Israeli Interior Ministry, the number of these illegal immigrants
amounted to 26,635 people to July 2010 and over 55,000 in January 2012. Many of the undocumented workers seek an
asylum status under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of the United Nations. Only a fraction of all the
undocumented workers is actually eligible for this status – in the summer of 2012, the Israeli government deported a
large number of such immigrants. http://rt.com/news/israel-immigrants-deport-mass-907/
53 http://www.adva.org/default.asp?pageid=5 – 14. December 2012
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basing the perceptions on selective and manipulative historical, cultural or religious interpretation (Yiftachel,
2006:14). The mobilizing power of ethnonationalism is evident in Israel/Palestine, where Zionism has
claimed the right to the land and has implemented a project of Judaizing the land in the name of national
self-determination in a Jewish homeland.
The discourse and idea of the national ‘homeland’ is according to Yiftachel often central to the ethnocratic
project. The homeland is referred to as the birthplace of the nation and the territory on which it ought to
establish its collective future. In the current regime of nation-states the connection between national
collectivity and the homeland constitutes a critical factor in attaining collective power (Yiftachel, 2006:41).
Most territories have a multilayered history, which is often differently presented by different national or
ethnic groups. As illustrated by the case of Israel/Palestine, this makes the claim for collective ownership by
different groups the basis for the most protracted ethnic conflicts. Furthermore the social and symbolic
meaning of territory is also important to keep in mind, since the symbolic part of territory is part of the
process through which national identities are constructed and maintained.
When a national or political movement like the Zionists raise collective political claims for territorial self-
determination in Israel and the OPT, an important dimension of these claims are the development of a
homeland discourse; concretized in political messages, maps, signs, cultural icons, speeches and official
documents, with the aim of symbolically, discursive and materially to shape a particular territory as a
national homeland (Yiftachel, 2006:41). In the case of Israel/Palestine, as pointed out by Weizman, one of
the most important strategies of obfuscation has been that of terminology especially evident on the
terminology used regarding the right of the Jews to all of the territory of the previous Mandate Territory and
regarding the settlement enterprise.54
The making of such territorial Identities is evident in Israel’s Declaration of Independence as well as in the
Palestinian Declaration of Independence. Worth noticing is how both the Israelis and the Palestinians use the
argumentation of the birthplace and that both Declarations of Independence emphasize their right to the
territory.
The land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here its spiritual, religious and political identity
was shaped. Here it first attained statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance..
After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it throughout their diaspora and never
ceased to pray and hope for their return… By virtue of our natural and historic right we hereby declare the
establishment of a Jewish state in the Land of Israel - Israel’s Declaration of Independence, May 15, 1948
54 I will elaborate on the settlement terminology in the chapter on Israel’s territorial strategies.
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Palestine… is where the Palestinian Arab people was born, on which it grew, developed and excelled.. [Its]
willed dispossession and expulsion… was achieved by organized terror. In Palestine and in exile, the
Palestinian Arab people never faltered and never abandoned its conviction in its rights of return and
independence… and the right of sovereignty over territory and homeland.. The Palestinian National
Council.. hereby declares the establishment of the State of Palestine on our Palestinian territory -
Palestinian Declaration of Independence, November 15, 1988
(Yiftachel, 2006:51)
In most countries these processes of establishing a homeland or a nation can be observed, but the particular
about the case of Israel/Palestine is the connection of Zionism, religion and nationalism often observe in
ethnocracies as well as the exclusion of the ethnic group of Palestinians. The homeland in such cases often
becomes what professor Winichakul (1994) defines as a ‘geobody’, a spatial icon (designed by the shape of
the state’s map or desired territory) ceaselessly used and ‘performed’ to gain a scared status in the national
canon. The map of Israel/Palestine has assumed the character of such a geobody (showing the whole of
Israel/Palestine as Israeli or Palestinian respectively), and are used as an icon for the mobilization of both
Zionist and Palestinians over the same piece of land.
5.3 Characterizing the conflict
When characterizing the conflict it is useful to first characterize the agents and their balance of power. As
established in chapter 2.2 the Israeli state can be characterized as an ethnocracy or an ethnocratic regime.
This type of regime promotes the expansion of the dominant group in contested territory and its domination
of power structures while maintaining a democratic façade. Manifest in the Israeli case is the long-term
Zionist strategy of Judaizing the homeland (Yiftachel, 2006). The Palestinians are vis-à-vis the Israeli state
the subordinate, following the Israeli invasion and occupation since 1967 as well as the ailing economy and
the weak political leadership (see chapter 2.1). Israel has since the Interim Agreement of 1995 (Oslo II)
controlled large areas of the West Bank, freely confiscating land and constructing infrastructure inside the
West Bank (Stockmarr, 2012, 36ff). According to Klein the Palestinian Authority has effectively been
crushed by Israel and is now showing symptoms of ‘state collapse’ (Klein, 2010:21)
The conflict is often characterized as a territorial conflict, where two people have conflicting claims to the
same territory. Following the recent development throughout the last decades, more and more theorists
characterize the conflict as an ethnic conflict rather than a territorial conflict (Klein, 2010:10, Yiftachel,
2006, Gordon, 2008). This seems to be prompted by Israel’s continuing occupation and territorial expansion,
the inequality of the conflict as well as the magnitude of the Israeli facts on the ground - established in the
West Bank, contrary to international law and the Hague Regulations. Many scholars and politicians are today
rejecting the idea of a two-state solution – the outline for a Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement since the
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November 2007 Annapolis Conference - arguing that the Israeli actions have undermined such a solution
(Stockmarr, 2012:40, Klein,2010 & Kattan, 2008).
The Israelis and the Palestinians have conflicting claims of the territory; the Israelis aspirating for the whole
territory of Israel and Palestine as well as a ‘United Jerusalem’, while the Palestinians in the latest peace
negotiations have been ready to settle on the 1967 borders as stated by the Palestinian president Mahmoud
Abbas in April 2012, where he in a letter to the Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu made clear, that
for the peace talks to resume, Israel must stop settlement building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and
accept the 1967 borders as a basis for a two-state solution (Bronner, 2012 & Abbas, 2012). The final issues
have still to be solved. This is also the line of the International community. But as recent events have shown
– the establishment of new settlements in the E1 area outside Jerusalem - Israel often says one thing, and
does another.
5.4 The socio-spatial structures in Israel/Palestine
When analyzing the territorial conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, it is evident that the age-
long conflict has left significant marks on the socio-spatial territory. The intertwining of geography
(territory) and politics (ideology) has led to a political organization of space mainly facilitated by the
expansionist Zionist project and the Israeli system of control. The control system constitutes what Klein
(2010) calls a matrix of control, managing the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip through an
extensive system of both visible and invisible control mechanisms. I will elaborate on the control system in
the section below, focusing here on the physical expressions of the Israeli control system as well as its
consequences for the feasibility of a Palestinian nation state.
As shown in the chapter on the Israeli state and the character of the conflict, the socio-spatial structures are
of great importance in the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, due to the intertwining of
territory and legitimacy (Stockmarr, 2012) as well as the importance of territory in the Israeli and Palestinian
self-understanding. Furthermore the demographics and political geography of the conflict are undermining
the tangibility of the two-state solution (ibid. & Klein, 2010).
The physical expressions of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank are first and foremost settlements.
According to the Israeli NGO B’tselem (The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied
Territories) Israel has taking control of some 50 percent of the land in the West Bank, primarily for
establishment of the settlements and preparation of land reserves for their expansion. They used complex
legal-bureaucratic mechanisms in order to do so, mainly the declaration and recording of the land as ‘state
land’ 55(I will elaborate on these measures in the chapter on the Israeli control system). According to
55 http://www.btselem.org/settlements/statistics - 14. December 2012
48
B’tselem the geographic scope of the settlements are located in three strips - running north to south - and one
around the Jerusalem metropolitan area. The strips are identified as; The Mountain Strip; located along the
largest populous centers of the West Bank – Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Hebron and Bethlehem – running
parallel to Route 60, the main transport artery in the West Bank; The Eastern Strip; located in the Jordan
Valley and along the shores of the Dead Sea; The Western Hill Strip; located in the area west of the
mountain ridge through the Green Line; and the Jerusalem Metropolis; located in the annexed area of East
Jerusalem and its surroundings, cutting off the eastern part of the city from the West Bank, and the Old City
from its Arab Metropolitan Area (Stockmarr, 2012:27f).
The latest developments following the UN General Assembly’s recognition of Palestine as a state (on 29
November 2012) are suggesting that Israel has decided to advance the planning of thousands of apartments
near the settlement of Ma’ale Adumim, as part of the E-1 Plan, in the area connecting the settlement to
Jerusalem. The implementation of construction plans in E1 will create an urban bloc between Ma’ale
Adumim and Jerusalem, exacerbating the isolation of East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank and will
to some extent disrupt the territorial contiguity between the northern and the southern parts of the West
Bank56. As illustrated on the map below, the planned route of the barrier will encompass the area of E1 and
will together with the already built part of the barrier create an effective separation of the entire city of
Jerusalem from the West Bank (see map below).
The settlements are further more altering the geography of the Occupied Territories through a complicated
system of separate infrastructure (creating rapid corridors used by Israeli citizens), sewage systems and water
supply as well as through military bases erected to protect the settlers and finally the illegal outposts, often
offspring of the established settlements (Gordon, 2008: 23ff). The Israeli control system, managing the
continued occupation, are also causing extensive imprints in the spatial and social territory of the West Bank
through check points, road blocks, military bases and other so called security measures (Stockmarr,
2012:25). According to a 2011 report by OCHA (United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs) the Israeli occupation authorities set up 522 obstacles (roadblocks, checkpoints etc)
across the West Bank, marking a four percent increase since a similar report made in June 201057.  The result
of the restrictions is that Palestinians in some 70 villages and communities, with a total population of more
than 200.000, are forced to use bypass roads to travel up to five times the length of direct roads between
major cities, which in turn has restricted access to basic services and deteriorated the economic situation of
the affected villages and communities (ibid.).
56 http://www.btselem.org/settlements/20121202_e1_human_rights_ramifications - 14. December 2012
57 http://www.palestine-
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Another solid result of the Israeli occupation is the separation barrier (or apartheid wall)58. The wall was
build in June 2002 on the initiative of Prime Minister as a physical barrier between Israel and the West Bank,
its declared objective to prevent the uncontrolled entry of terrorists (Palestinians) into Israel. In most areas,
the barrier is comprised of an electronic fence with dirt paths, barbed-wire fences, and trenches on both
sides, at an average width of 60 meters. In some areas a concrete wall has been erected, six to eight meters
high. The length of the wall – already built, under construction, or in planning – is 709 kilometers, a distance
twice as long as the Green Line59. According to B’tselem 85 percent of the wall is placed on or inside
Palestinian territory, 8,5 per cent of the West Bank area is on the Israeli side of the barrier, and 3,4% is on
the other side but partly or completely surrounded60. Consequently the barrier is in itself a mean to annex
Palestinian land to Israel. The Green Line is no longer the effectual border inasmuch as it no longer marks
the division between different forms of the implementation of the Israeli control system. Neither does the
Barrier mark off the territory where one form of control gives way to another. The distinction, in fact, is no
longer territorial (Klein, 2010:15). As shown by Klein (2010), rather than marking a clear border between the
Israeli and Palestinian ethnic entities, the fence encloses the Palestinians and perpetuates the unitary regime
that rules both Israel proper and the areas that were designated, in the negotiating process, to constitute the
Palestinian ethnic state (Klein, 2010:13).
5.5 The Israeli control system
According to Gordon the control system applied by Israel in the Occupied Territories have changed since the
mid-1990s from operating according to the colonization principle, to instead operating on a separation
principle (Gordon, 2008). These principles are consistent to Yiftachel’s notion of ethnocracy. This shift has
changed the form and content of the Israeli strategies; the separation principle leading to the abandonment of
efforts to administer the lives of the colonized population, while insisting on the continued exploitation of
nonhuman resources (land and water). This separation from the colonized population and an indifference
towards them, can according to Gordon explain the rise in lethal violence in the years after 2000 in addition
to the spur of violence in relation to the Second Intifada, which began in 2000 and ended around 2005.
According to Gordon the Israeli authorities and military control the Palestinians through a range of control
mechanisms. These means of control are constituted by coercive mechanism used to prohibit, exclude and
repress people as well as an entire array of institutions, legal devices, bureaucratic apparatuses, social
practices, and physical edifices, that operate both on the individual and the population in order to produce
new modes of behavior, habits, interests, tastes and aspirations (Gordon, 2008:3). In his characterization of
58 The costs of the wall so far are estimated to over 10 billion NIS (approximately 15 billion Danish kroner) with a
yearly maintenance cost of NIS 1 billion per year (approximately 1,5 billion Danish kroner) –
http://www.btselem.org/topic/separation_barrier - 14. December 2012
59 http://www.btselem.org/topic/separation_barrier - 14. December 2012
60 http://www.btselem.org/separation_barrier/statistics - 14. December 2012
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the Israeli control system, Gordon also touches on the particular features of the Israeli control system – the
previous Defense Minister Moshe Dayan’s legacy – the strategy of trying to normalize the occupation by
concealing Israel’s presence. ‘Don’t rule them’, Dayan once said, ‘let them live their own lives’ (Gordon,
2008:1).
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